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Book Reviews

plished "while continuing to imagine something different" (167).
To conform to the feminist ethic, responsible actions must be
"grounded in community": they must be informed by exchanges
between lawyers and clients that create "understanding of [each
other's] situations, abilities, and limitations" and reflect "respect
for each other's decisions" (169). Finally, a feminist ethic of risk
involves "strategic risk taking" that "challeng[es] authority when it
is possible to do so and with full knowledge of the risks involved
and awareness of who will bear the burden of failure" (170). As
Shdaimah observes, personal relationships are central to this ethic.
She argues that scholarship removed to the realm of abstraction
misses out on both the empirical realities and the transformative
possibilities of progressive lawyers' practice.
There are other things to like about this book as well. It will be
of interest to scholars of the professions, as it nicely illuminates
challenges faced by all kinds of professionals who provide direct
services to personal clients-for example, doctors, therapists, social
workers, teachers, and dentists, as well as some types of lawyers.
Among these are tensions between professional expertise and client
autonomy, tensions surrounding the boundaries of clientprofessional relationships and personal intimacy and empathy, and
tensions between what professional ethics and knowledge may prescribe and what clients' and professionals' capacities may permit. To
sociolegal scholars, it will be of interest as a new piece in the
growing mosaic of contemporary studies of how legal institutions
work in practice. To analysts of poverty, the book provides a valuable portrait of how civil law fits in to the maintenance and,
occasionally, the amelioration of inequality. The methodological
appendix is a good example of how to do such writing well.

Louis D. Brandeis and the Making of Regulated Competition,
1900-1932. By Gerald Berk. Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 296 pp. $85.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Ajay K. Mehrotra, Indiana University
Sociolegal scholars and historians of the American regulatory state
have long been interested in exploring how democratic institutions
in the early twentieth century challenged and accommodated the
rise of corporate capitalism. Those scholars who have focused on
U.S. antitrust law have tended to characterize the historical policy
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response to corporate consolidation as a binary choice between
progressive attempts to use public administration to harness and
regulate monopoly power and populist desires to diminish the size
of large corporations and restore market competition. In his new
book, Gerald Berk collapses this conventional dichotomy by persuasively showing that historical actors, led by the jurist and social
reformer Louis Brandeis, envisioned and paved a third way
between the populists and progressives. Berk refers to this alternative path as "regulated competition," which he cogently describes as
a fusion of progressive faith in scientific expertise and populist
affinities for market discipline.
In Berk's account, Brandeis is rightfully featured as the intellectual fountainhead of a "republican experimentalism" that gave
birth to regulated competition. By deploying modern scientific
means to achieve republican ends, Brandeis sought to use state
power to prod big businesses to think creatively about how they
could align their interests with those of consumers and regulators.
As a reformer and lawyer, Brandeis worked closely with engineers
and cost accountants at the Interstate Commerce Commission,
where he learned firsthand about the importance of disaggregating
business costs and encouraging information sharing among competitors. Unlike orthodox economists and laissez-faire constitutionalists, who presumed that particular business costs were natural and
fixed, and that courts could easily police the line between acceptable competition and impermissible monopoly power, Brandeis
and his acolytes contended that industrial production was as much
a social as a technological process, and that predatory economic
organizations like cartels could be transformed into cooperative
trade associations, thus obscuring the line between competition and
monopoly.
Brandeis was able to convince powerful lawmakers designing
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as well as key officials within
the nascent agency, to take seriously the idea of regulating big
businesses by cultivating industry habits of collaborative reflection,
inquiry, experimentation, and evaluation. Consequently, FTC officials were empowered to work with business leaders to channel
economic activity away from unproductive, cutthroat competition
and toward creative and constructive cooperation. To achieve these
ends, the agency hosted trade practice conferences, gathered
and disseminated information about different ways to measure
costs, developed benchmarking standards and best practices, and
revealed alternative methods of conceptualizing industrial production. Officials did all this, Berk argues, not by increasing the FTC's
top-down bureaucratic power over industry, but by blurring the
lines of authority within the agency, flattening hierarchical authority, and encouraging lateral communication among departments.
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These early achievements seemed doomed when the federal
courts, the U.S. Department ofJustice, and a branch of the American economics profession began in the 1920s to challenge elements
of the FTC's regulated competition. But, as Berk masterfully demonstrates, the judicial setbacks did not simply destroy regulated
competition. In chapter 5, which will be of great interest to readers
of this journal, Berk lucidly shows how these institutional constraints paradoxically provided creative reformers with new opportunities, for while the courts limited the FTC's ex ante coercive
authority, they provided space for the agency to experiment with
new and innovative forms of public-private "associationalism"
through trade practice conferences and other means of information
sharing. Ultimately, regulated competition was contained rather
than defeated, as certain aspects of it survived in particular industries well into the late twentieth century.
Like Berk's previous book (1994), this study provides a
welcome corrective to the existing historical institutionalist literature on regulatory law and American capitalism. Whereas many
scholars have tended to see technological and economic conditions
as rigid constraints on institutional development and policy choices,
Berk maintains that technology and economic activity can be
reinterpreted in numerous ways, and that as a result organizational
change and policy options can potentially be more flexible and
open. Relying on what he refers to as a theory of "creative syncretism," Berk contends that institutions contain multiple components
that can be unpacked and repackaged in unpredictable ways,
providing imaginative reformers with opportunities to reframe
long-standing problems in new ways and to search out, through
democratic deliberation, innovative policy solutions. Thus, Brandeis and proponents of regulated competition were unwilling to
take for granted the economists' theoretical conclusion that high,
fixed business costs always and everywhere dictate the need for
high volume production. Instead, they revealed how volume-based
accounting shrouded salient differences in the production process.
By doing so, creative syncretists like Brandeis paved a possible path
for regulated competition.
In addition to challenging standard historical institutionalist
accounts, the book complements a growing interdisciplinary, sociolegal historiography that continues to debunk the myth of the weak
American state. Berk convincingly demonstrates that one reason
why scholars have mistakenly depicted the American regulatory
state, and the FTC in particular, as anemic is that they have been
preoccupied with measuring state power in classical, Weberian
terms. If one examines less conspicuous but equally effective means
of governance, such as the collaborative statecraft at the heart of
regulated competition, one can see that flattened and disbursed
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public power was-and can still potentially be-an effective means
of regulation.
Experts in the field might quibble with how Berk uses certain
historical constructs as foils for his narrative. His reliance on an
outdated and at times monolithic notion of populism and progressivism, for instance, or his implicit characterization of the earlytwentieth-century American economics profession as a homogenous
and rigid group of thinkers, can correctly be questioned. Still,
despite these minor criticisms, Berk's book ought to garner the
attention of law and society scholars interested in organizational
theory and institutional development. It is without doubt an
invaluable contribution to the history of American law and political
economy.

Reference
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Statelessness in the European Union: Displaced, Undocumented,
Unwanted. By Caroline Sawyer & Brad K. Blitz, eds. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 366 pp. $105.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Anna Dolidze, Cornell University

The most recent influx of migrants from North African countries to
Europe resuscitated the European Union debate on immigration
policy. Statelessness in the European Union is a welcome and timely
addition to the debate. Moreover, the book is a valuable contribution to the more general ongoing discussion on the changing
nature of state sovereignty and its effect on noncitizens and the
value of citizenship. The book will be of particular interest to
individuals studying issues raised by migration, particularly in
Europe, as well as those who study the rights of noncitizens.
The book could be divided into three main parts. The introduction by Caroline Sawyer and Brad K. Blitz carefully delineates
the analytical framework of the book, explains the methodology,
and places it in the relevant scholarship. The second part, which
includes more theoretical and general discussion on the issue of
statelessness, includes contributions by Monika Krause, Matthew J.
Gibney, Caroline Sawyer, and Brad K. Blitz.

